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I.  INTRODUCTION 
By the time Dick Woodson was selected as the first player to go through 
salary arbitration, baseball’s troubled labor history was already well-
established and was nearing a breaking point.1  Amidst increasingly common 
player holdouts related to salary disputes and the uniformly hostile attitudes 
of penurious owners, players looked to unionize as a way to fight for their 
rights.2  With unionization came collective bargaining agreements.3  The first 
such agreement, in 1968, provided the framework for both grievance and 
salary arbitration.4  It was not until 1974, however, that salary arbitration 
 
 1.  See Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional Baseball, 1 
SPORTS L. J. 183, 183–190 (1994) (outlining the tumultuous history of labor relations in professional 
baseball).   
 2.  See id. at 184–87.   
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 189.   
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actually went into effect, with the Woodson arbitration.5  In agreeing to this 
negotiation practice owners hoped to stop salary holdouts and rationalized 
that, in the long run, they might prevent free agency.6  While the affirming 
vote was a near-unanimous 22-2, one notable dissenter was Dick Meyer, a 
brewery executive and experienced negotiator who represented the 
Cardinals.7  Meyers said at the time, “[t]his will be baseball’s ruin.”8 
When asked why he was selected as the first player for salary 
arbitration, Dick Woodson said, “I was picked because I was the poster child 
of the most abused in Major League Baseball as far as contract 
negotiations.”9  It is ironic that it was Woodson’s perceived mistreatment 
that led to his selection, as that dubious honor only served to exacerbate his 
predicament.10  Woodson himself never experienced the benefits of salary 
arbitration.11  When his playing career ended prematurely due to injury on 
July 8, 1974—as a member of the New York Yankees, a team he loathed12—
Woodson was indignant and bitter.13  As a martyr to the cause of fair player 
compensation, however, Woodson inadvertently ushered in an era of 
unprecedented player leverage, evident today in the outrageous salaries of 
many professional baseball players.14 
The present state of the business of baseball is a direct result of the 
implementation of what has come to be known as “baseball style 
arbitration,” a process that began in 1974 with Dick Woodson.15  So, while 
Woodson himself never reaped the benefits of baseball’s arbitration system, 
his legacy endures to seek his revenge.  Like a vengeful apparition, 
Woodson is there every time a flustered owner wincingly signs a multi-
million dollar contract and an underpaid young player cashes in. 
This paper will examine the evolution of salary arbitration in 
professional baseball through the lens of the original 1974 Dick Woodson 
salary arbitration.  Part II will discuss the general development of labor 
relations in professional baseball, with an emphasis on how and why salary 
 
 5.  See Roger I. Abrams, Inside Baseball’s Salary Arbitration Process, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 55, 55 (1999). 
 6.  See Maury Brown, Evolution of Salary Arbitration: An Ironic Tale, YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 
19, 2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=ys-maurybrownarbitration011910. 
 7.  Id.   
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Telephone Interview by Twinstrivia.com with Dick Woodson, Former Pitcher, Minnesota 
Twins (2011), available at http://twinstrivia.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Woodsonsalaryarb. 
mp3 [hereinafter Audio Interview with Dick Woodson]. 
 10.  See infra Part III. 
 11.  See id.  
 12.  See infra note 79.   
 13.  See id. 
 14.  See infra Part V.A.1.  
 15.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text.   
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arbitration came to be implemented.  Part III will focus specifically on Dick 
Woodson’s salary arbitration and how that experience shaped the immediate 
evolution of the practice and informed the current state of affairs in Major 
League Baseball (“MLB”).  Part IV will discuss MLB’s salary arbitration 
rules and how the process actually works.  Part V will address prevailing 
criticisms of baseball style arbitration as it exists today—ultimately 
contending that it is a good system that consistently and effectively achieves 
its primary goal of settlement.  Part VI briefly concludes. 
II.  HISTORY 
In 1908, Pittsburgh Pirates outfielder Tommy Leach used the term 
“arbitration” to describe the mechanism he proposed to settle his 
salary dispute with club management . . . . Pirates owner Barney 
Dreyfuss declined to participate in this novel procedure, because he 
neither had to nor wanted to.  Instead, he offered Leach an 
ultimatum to accept his terms or leave baseball.  Leach signed.16 
Leach’s experience is indicative of the nature of player-owner 
interaction in the pre-arbitration era in Major League Baseball.17  Owners 
had no incentive or reason to bargain with individual players, therefore, they 
chose not to.18  The dictatorial position that owners enjoyed came from the 
“reserve system,” which effectively deeded each player to the team for 
which he originally signed—for life.19 
While the reserve system began as a way to retain a select number of 
players, owners immediately recognized the implicit benefits and by the 
1880s every individual player had a reserve clause inserted in his contract.20  
By restricting players’ mobility and limiting their options, owners were able 
 
 16.  Abrams, supra note 5, at 57.   
 17.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text.   
 18.  See Donegan, supra note 1, at 183–89.   
 19.  See Donegan, supra note 1, at 184:  
The reserve clause allowed a team to have exclusive rights to a player for the year 
following the contract year.  This invariably meant that a player was bound to that team 
for life because the reserve clause bound him to one team in perpetual one-year contracts.  
Faced with either sitting out a year to gain free agency, being traded, or retiring, most 
players were forced to accept the owners’ contracts. 
See also The Curious Case of Curt Flood, (HBO Sports television broadcast July 13, 2011) 
(documenting Curt Flood’s fight against MLB’s reserve system, which led to reform but also 
destroyed his career).   
 20.  See Bibek Das, Salary Arbitration and the Effects on Major League Baseball and Baseball 
Players, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55 (2003). 
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to keep salary costs low.21  Players saw potential reprieve in arbitration—a 
“formalized mechanism for neutrally settling disputes.”22  It was clear, 
however, that “baseball’s management was not going to engage in the 
arbitration process” voluntarily.23 
Players realized that without the ability to collectively bargain they 
would make little progress toward fairer negotiations and higher salaries; 
however, initial attempts to unionize proved futile.24  Even after players 
ultimately succeeded in organizing in 1954 with the creation of the first 
sustainable players union, the Major League Baseball Players Association 
(“MLBPA”), which still exists today—they still struggled to improve their 
position.25  Everything changed in 1966 when Marvin Miller left his position 
as chief economist for the United States’ third-largest union, the United 
Steelworkers of America, to become the executive director of the MLBPA.26  
Miller believed that arbitration would be an indispensable tool for slowly 
doing away with the reserve system.27  In 1968, Miller brokered baseball’s 
first basic collective bargaining agreement, which included the framework 
for both grievance and salary arbitration.28  It was in 1972, however, that 
Miller mobilized players in an unprecedented manner—he organized a 
strike.29  By the end of the 1972 season, owners were ready to come to the 
bargaining table.30 
Perhaps surprisingly, there was little resistance to salary arbitration 
when it was proposed in 1973.31  In fact, it was the owners who actually first 
 
 21.  See Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major 
League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and Transfer Disputes, 
20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 121 (2009). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  See Donegan, supra note 1, at 184–87.  Prior to the creation of the fifth player’s union on 
July 12, 1954—the Major League Baseball Players Association, which is still in existence today—
there were four unsuccessful attempts at unionization: (1) the Players League in 1890; (2) The 
League Protective Players Association in 1900; (3) The Baseball Players Fraternity, which operated 
from 1912-1918; and, (4) The American Baseball Guild in 1948.  Each union either failed or was 
dissolved due to lack of player interest.  Id.       
 25.  See id. at 186. 
 26.  See Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 121 (“Although the MLBPA union was established in 1954, 
it was not until Miller assumed the organization’s top role that true negotiations commenced 
between labor and management.”). 
 27.  See id. at 121–22 (quoting MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE 
INSIDE STORY OF BASEBALL’s NEW DEAL 239 (1991)) (“‘With impartial arbitration in effect, we 
could argue the meaning and interpretation of a contract provision,’ Miller wrote in his 
autobiography.  ‘It was only a matter of time, I felt, before we could test whether a club’s right of 
renewal of a contract lasted forever.’”).  
 28.  Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 121. 
 29.  Id. at 122. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See Brown, supra note 6 (referencing 22-2 vote in favor of salary arbitration). 
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proposed the use of this process in the negotiations following the 1972 
strike.32  This is, in part, because owners saw salary arbitration as the lesser 
of two evils—the greater being free agency.33  In fact, only two people voted 
against the proposition on behalf of their teams: Charlie Finley, the 
flamboyant owner of the Oakland Athletics,34 and Dick Meyer, of the St. 
Louis Cardinals.35  Meyer was an expert on baseball labor issues who had 
experience with binding arbitration from when he was labor chief of 
Anheuser-Busch.36  Finley, the antithesis of many of the other team owners, 
was born into modest circumstances, and has been described as “aggressive, 
a street-smart realist.”37  Each man “correctly predicted what would happen 
if owners abandoned a take-it-or-leave-it stance with players and agreed to 
salary arbitration”: perpetually increasing salaries—or, as Meyer put it, 
“baseball’s ruin.”38 
Ultimately it was not so much the arbitration process, generally, that 
proved to be “baseball’s ruin”—i.e. the end of the player-owner dynamic as 
it had existed up to that point—but rather the peculiar and novel fashion in 
which baseball style arbitration was to proceed.  While the decision to 
implement salary arbitration had been more or less unanimous among 
owners, it took three weeks of heated negotiations to settle on a format and 
structure for the actual process.39  It was finally determined that baseball 
arbitration would be based on a “final offer format”—the arbitrator would 
have to choose either the owner’s or the player’s position and could not 
 
 32.  Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 122–23.  
 33.  See Brown, supra note 6.  Ironically, it was through the grievance arbitration process that 
free agency was ultimately born, in the “Messersmith-Mcnalley” arbitration, which has been called 
“the most important arbitration decision in the history of professional sports.”  See Donegan, supra 
note 1, at 187–88 (quoting MILLER, supra note 27, at 238). 
 34.  See G. MICHAEL GREEN & ROGER D. LAUNIS, CHARLIE FINLEY: THE OUTRAGEOUS STORY 
OF BASEBALL’S SUPER SHOWMAN (2010).   
 35.  See Brown, supra note 6; see also Jerome Holtzman, Player Salaries Uphold Wrigley 
Arbitration View, CHI. TRIB. SPORTS (Jan. 23, 1994), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-01-
23/sports/9401230223_1_arbitration-owners-finley (quoting Charlie Finley to convey the 
improbability of a nearly unanimous vote in favor of salary arbitration) [hereinafter Holtzman, 
Wrigley]:  
I contacted every owner either personally or by telephone and I told them, one and all, the 
evils of arbitration.  They all listened very attentively and thanked me for taking the time 
to call them.  If I had been a betting man I would have bet all the tea in China that at least 
18 of the teams would have voted against arbitration.  But when it came to a vote, only 
the St. Louis Cardinals and Oakland A’s voted against it.  
 36.  Brown, supra note 6.  
 37.  Holtzman, Wrigley, supra note 35. 
 38.  Brown, supra note 6.  
 39.  See Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 123.  
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compromise between them.40  While the mutually inherent risk of a no-
compromise format was designed to encourage settlements,41 it quickly 
became apparent that when settlement was not reached and cases actually 
proceeded to arbitration, players won—even when they lost.42  The owners 
had signed their own death warrants. 
It did not take the owners long to realize what they had done.43  In 1974 
and 1975, the system produced a number of positive results for players 
regardless of whether they won or lost their hearings.44  The McNally-
Messersmith arbitration decision of 1975,45 which finally destroyed the 
reserve system,46 only exacerbated the general climate of labor relations in 
baseball.47  There was a lockout during spring training in 1976, and salary 
arbitration was suspended for that year as well as 1977.48  By 1980, owners 
were pressing for the elimination of salary arbitration altogether.49  The 
owners were unsuccessful, but they did manage to tighten the eligibility 
requirements for arbitration.50  In 1990, MLB locked out players for thirty 
two days during spring training over a dispute related to tightened eligibility 
requirements.51  The worst of the headbutting, however, was in 1994, when a 
232-day strike that began on August 12 caused the cancellation of the 
remainder of the 1994 season—including the playoffs and the World 
 
 40.  Id. at 123–24.   
 41.  See Darren Heitner, A Deep Look into Baseball’s Salary Arbitration System, SPORTS AGENT 
BLOG (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2010/04/08/a-deep-look-into-baseballs-
salary-arbitration-system/ (describing baseball arbitration as a system “that really aims to create 
settlements”). 
 42.  See Thomas Gorman, The Arbitration Process, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Jan. 31 2005), 
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=15864 (explaining that pay cuts are 
virtually unheard of in baseball salary arbitration because, if owners do not offer more money than 
the player is currently making, the arbitrator will more likely than not consider the player’s 
suggested salary figure the more reasonable of the two offers).  The last case where someone walked 
out of an arbitration hearing with less money than they made the previous year was Randy Milligan, 
in 1994.  Id.       
 43.  See Ed Edmunds, A Most Interesting Part of Baseball’s Monetary Structure—Salary 
Arbitration in Its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2009). 
 44.  Id. at 4.   
 45.  Nat'l & Am. League Prof'l v. Major League Players Assn., 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. 101 (1975). 
 46.  See Donegan, supra note 1, at 187–89.   
 47.  See Edmunds, supra note 43, at 4–5.   
 48.  Id. at 4.  
 49.  Id. at 5.  
 50.  Id.  Instead of salary arbitration, owners wanted individual negotiations for wages with the 
creation of a fixed salary scheme and compensation for a team losing a player to free agency.  Id.  
The resulting agreement did not eliminate arbitration, but it did reduce the eligibility for arbitration 
to two years of service.  Id.  In 1985, a new agreement changed the eligibility requirement from two 
years to three years of credited service.  Id.  That same year, the MLBPA staved off attempts by 
owners to cap the size of salary increases gained in arbitration.  Id.   
 51.  Id. 
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Series—as well as the first eighteen games of the 1995 schedule.52  Again, 
owners were trying to eliminate salary arbitration altogether.53  Unable to do 
so, they proposed a switch from a sole arbitrator to a panel of three at the 
beginning of the 1995 season.54  That transition was uniformly implemented 
in 2000.55  The structure of baseball salary arbitration has remained 
essentially the same since then. 
Looking back, it is clear that the owners had no idea what they were 
getting into when they agreed to allow Dick Woodson, a right-handed 
pitcher for the Minnesota Twins with a 10-8 record in 1973, the opportunity 
to go to arbitration to fight for the right to increase his salary from the 
$23,000 he was offered to $30,000.56  On Monday, February 11, 1974, 
Woodson, MLBPA attorney Richard Moss, Twins owner Clark Griffith, and 
American League attorney James P. Garner all met in a room before 
arbitrator Henry Platt for more than four hours in Major League Baseball’s 
first salary arbitration hearing.57  Like a roaring wildfire started with a single 
match, the era of baseball salary arbitration had begun. 
III.  THE FIRST SALARY ARBITRATION 
Dick Woodson never had a good relationship with Calvin Griffith, then-
owner of the Minnesota Twins.58  Griffith had fought manager Billy Martin 
every step of the way when Martin initially tried to bring Woodson up from 
the minors to the Twins, and then later fought against any attempt to 
increase Woodson’s salary, even prior to arbitration.59  According to 
Woodson, Griffith “did everybody that way,” but he still feels that he may 
have gotten the worst of it.60 
After the 1972 season, despite being a strong contributor, Griffith 
offered Woodson the league minimum salary.61  The Twins owner explained 
that raising Woodson’s salary with the league minimum meant that he was 
 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 6.   
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See Edmunds, supra note 43, at 1. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See Audio Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 9.   
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See Interview by John Swol with Dick Woodson, Former Pitcher, Minnesota Twins, 
available at http://twinstrivia.com/interview-archives/dick-woodson-interview/ [hereinafter 
Interview with Dick Woodson]. 
 61.  See Audio Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 9.   
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getting a $2,000 raise.62  When Woodson protested, Griffith gave him the 
“Tommy Leach treatment,”63 explaining that he could “either sign the 
contract or go and carry a lunch bucket.”64  Woodson never forgot that 
comment.65 
Following the unsuccessful contract negotiations at the start of the 1973 
season, Woodson was handpicked by Marvin Miller for the first salary 
arbitration from among several players who were similarly dissatisfied with 
their contracts.66  Woodson insists he was chosen because of just how 
abusive Griffith was to him from a compensation standpoint.67  Despite 
being given the opportunity to fight for a fair salary, Woodson recalls being 
something like a “sacrificial lamb,” because at that point no one really 
understood how the process would work.68  It was recommended that he 
retain counsel, but as Woodson points out today, “a guy making fifteen 
grand can’t afford that.”69 
Woodson went to the arbitration hoping to double his salary from 
$15,000 to $30,000.70  What he did not realize in picking his figure, 
however, was that his desired salary would also be compared to National 
League pitchers (the Twins are an American league organization).71  What 
that meant for Woodson was that players who had worse records, worse 
innings pitched, the same number of years of service, and so on, were 
making $20,000–$25,000 more than even the best-case compensation he had 
demanded.72  In fact, when the arbitration ended and Woodson prevailed, the 
arbitrator’s final question was, “Why did you ask for so little?”73 
Woodson came to the arbitration alone and spoke on his own behalf 
with only his stats to support his position.74  To counter his demand the 
Twins argued that he was a .500 pitcher on a .500 team.75  Notably, however, 
the Twins focused less on disputing Woodson’s stats and more on the price 
of oil, repeatedly arguing that fans would not attend games because they 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 64.  Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 60.  
 65.  Audio Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 9.  
 66.  Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 60.  
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id.  Woodson has said that after his salary arbitration “a lot of guys[] revisited their figures,” 
and presumably adjusted them upwards.  Id.  
 74.  Audio Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 9.    
 75.  Id. 
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would not be able to afford gas to drive to the stadium.76 Ostensibly, the 
Twins—who were represented by Clark Griffith, Calvin Griffith’s son and a 
future law professor, plus another attorney—hoped to convince the arbitrator 
that lower attendance resulting from the 1974 oil shortage would mean they 
would have less money to pay Woodson’s increased salary. 
Despite winning his case, it is clear that today Woodson still has mixed 
feelings about the arbitration process.77  While he does not blame Marvin 
Miller for “sacrificing” him and is grateful for the opportunity to have 
participated in the first baseball salary arbitration, he resents not having been 
better prepared for the experience—not knowing how to “play the game” 
until it was over.78  It seems that what stung Woodson the most, however, 
was how he was treated after the fact.79  When asked whether he feels he was 
blackballed from baseball for participating in the first salary arbitration, 
Woodson has suggested that his decision to participate almost certainly had 
an adverse effect on his playing time.80 
IV.  MLB ARBITRATION TODAY 
While the basic structure of MLB salary arbitration has changed little 
since its adoption in 1973,81 the experience for players going through the 
process today is quite different from what Dick Woodson experienced nearly 
forty years ago.82  Even more remarkable than the changes in the player 
experience, however, is the general change in owners’ perceptions of the 
process.  While it was the owners who initially proposed the use of salary 
arbitration—largely as a way to stave off free agency83—they quickly 
 
 76.  Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 60. 
 77.  See id. (“On one hand I was honored that Marvin Miller would pick me for [arbitration] but 
on the other hand I was really sacrificed.  I don’t think it wasn’t [sic] really Marvin Miller[’s] 
intention, I just did not know how the game was played until after I went through the process.”).  
 78.  See id. 
 79.  See Audio Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 9.   
 80.  See id. (“They didn’t pick me very often [after the arbitration].  I just sat in the bullpen.”).  
After the arbitration, Calvin Griffith was quoted as saying during spring training that he would never 
pay Woodson the money he won at arbitration—that he would trade him before he would ever pay 
on that contract.  Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 60.  True to his word, Griffith traded 
Woodson to the New York Yankees in May of 1974.  Id.  In interviews, Woodson has recalled how 
difficult it was playing for the Yankees.  See id. (“It was difficult when I was traded to the Yankees, 
being a Dodger fan . . . my dad wouldn’t even talk to me for six months.  I could not even look at 
myself in the mirror with the pinstripes on, [sic] it was really hard.”).     
 81.  See supra text accompanying note 31.   
 82.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text.   
 83.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text.   
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realized that through the arbitration process they would not only have to 
abandon their take-it-or-leave-it approach to salary negotiations,84 but also 
that the “final offer” format meant they had to uniformly and preemptively 
increase their offers in order to minimize their losses.85  Owners who came 
in too low risked the possibility that the arbitrator would see the player’s 
demand as the more reasonable of the two proposed numbers.86  What this 
meant, really, was more money for the players whether they won or lost the 
actual arbitration hearing.87  Along with free agency, salary arbitration was 
destined to have one major effect in baseball: the steep and rapid rise in 
player salaries.88 
A.  Enaction & Eligibility 
The MLBPA enacted salary arbitration with good intentions as a way to 
fairly compensate players who are similarly situated in position, ability, and 
statistics.89  The final offer or “last-best” format was selected to encourage 
the club and player to engage in good-faith negotiations.90  Ideally, this 
format draws the two offers toward the center rather than forcing a polarized 
pair of starting points.91  Because neither side is given an indication on how 
the arbitrator will react to their final offers, the process generates just the 
kind of uncertainty that is well calculated to compel the parties to seek 
security in agreement.92  It is this mutually inherent risk that makes final 
offer arbitration such an effective settlement tool.93 
There are two main groups of players who are eligible for salary 
arbitration: (1) free agents, and (2) players who have not yet accumulated the 
six years of service time necessary for free agency.94  Because it is 
extraordinarily rare for a team to actually plan on going to salary arbitration 
with one of its free agents, the process exists primarily for those players who 
 
 84.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text, note 64 (evidencing owners’ dismissive treatment 
of players’ salary concerns in the pre-arbitration era).   
 85.  See supra note 42.   
 86.  See id.  
 87.  See Holtzman, Wrigley, supra note 35 (explaining how, in a particular arbitration “season,” 
owners “had to increase their offers across the board” in order to ultimately minimize losses). 
 88.  Donegan, supra note 1, at 190. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 191.   
 91.  Eldon L. Ham & Jeffrey Malach, Hardball Free Agency—The Unintended Demise of Salary 
Arbitration in Major League Baseball: How the Law of Unintended Consequences Crippled the 
Salary Arbitration Remedy—and How to Fix It, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 63, 77 (2010). 
 92.  Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 111 (quoting Carl M. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration 
Compatible with Bargaining?, 5 INDUS. REL. 38 (1966)). 
 93.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 94.  See Gorman, supra note 42.   
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have not yet reached free agency status.95  If, however, free agents do go the 
arbitration route, they are subject to a different set of rules.96 
B.  Process 
MLB Salary arbitration is something of a trial by statistics,97 augmented 
with a focus on certain allowable criteria.98  The arbitrators, while far more 
knowledgeable about baseball today than when the process began,99 are 
arbitration experts—not baseball experts.  Accordingly, no advanced 
metrics are used to make a case.100  Even so, the process is decidedly stat-
based.101 
 
 95.  Id.  Teams do not want to go to arbitration with free agents because the arbitration hearing 
tends to award higher salaries than the free market for players who were looking at pay cuts (in the 
market).  Id.  Pay cuts are virtually unheard of in arbitration, so a player’s expectation could actually 
be higher in an arbitration case.  Id.  Further, free agents usually do not want to go to arbitration 
because the one-year deal they receive offers far less security and total money than a negotiated 
multi-year deal.   Id. 
 96.  Id.   
 97.  See Abrams, supra note 5, at 65–69. 
 98.  See Article VI, Section F(12) of the current CBA: 
(A) The criteria will be the quality of the Player’s contribution to his Club during the 
past season (including but not limited to his overall performance, special qualities 
of leadership and public appeal), the length and consistency of his career 
contribution, the record of the Player’s past compensation, comparative baseball 
salaries . . . , the existence of any physical or mental defects on the part of the 
Player, and the recent performance record of the Club including but not limited to 
its League standing and attendance as an indication of public acceptance . . . . 
(B) Evidence of the following shall not be admissible: 
(i) The financial position of the Player and the Club; 
(ii) Press comments, testimonials or similar material bearing on the performance 
of either the Player or the Club, except that recognized annual Player awards 
for playing excellence shall not be excluded; 
(iii) Offers made by either Player or Club prior to arbitration; 
(iv) The cost to the parties of their representative, attorneys, etc.; 
(v) Salaries in other sports or occupations 
 99.  See Jerome Holtzman, Owners Still Spell Nightmare A-r-b-i-t-r-a-t-i-o-n, CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
(Jan. 16, 1992), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-01-16/sports/9201050414_1_largest-
arbitration-award-cubs-star-relief-pitcher [hereinafter Holtzman, Nightmare].  There, Hotlzman 
recalls the “oft-told story” in which a player’s agent compared his client with some of the great 
players of the past.  Id.  Again and again the arbitrator failed to recognize each name, until 
eventually Babe Ruth was mentioned.  Id.  “The arbitrator sighed in relief and said, ‘Now that’s a 
name I recognize.’”  Id.     
 100.  Brown, supra note 6.  
 101.  See Abrams, supra note 5, at 66: 
Today’s salary arbitration hearing room table is adorned with laptop computers capable 
of generating any needed comparison in any instant.  Every claim is met with a 
counterclaim until the arbitrators are left with a huge pile of numbers.  Player 
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The winning strategy in salary arbitration is to present in simple, 
straightforward terms the right class of comparable players, focusing on the 
core characteristics of the player whose case is being adjudicated.102  The 
most important issue is not how well the player performed, but how well he 
performed compared to other players.103  Experienced MLB arbitrators 
further suggest that, among the statistics presented, game-winning (or game-
losing) events should be the focus of the presentation.104 
As to how the hearing actually proceeds, both the club and the player 
submit their “last best offer,” ahead of time, to the Labor Relationships 
Department and the MLBPA.105  When the parties appear at the arbitration 
they supply the three-person panel of arbitrators with a Uniform Player 
Contract that has been properly completed except for the salary figure.106  
Each side gets one hour to offer its evidence and an additional one-half hour 
to rebut any opposing claims.107  The proceedings are contractually private 
and confidential.108  At the conclusion of the hearing, the arbitrator must 
decide between the two offers.109  The manner in which decisions are issued 
is one of the most criticized facets of the entire process—particularly the fact 
that arbitrators’ decisions are not written out or formally rationalized.110  
Without issuing written decisions there is no indication as to what kind of 
weight the arbitrators placed on the particular statistics presented.  Without 
knowing the weight attached to each statistic—without any real explanation, 
 
performance is chopped and diced, particularized and dissected.  Anything not easily 
convertible into numerical terms, such as team leadership, hustle and courage in the face 
of debilitating injury, seems to play no role. 
 102.  Id. at 66–67.  
 103.  Id. at 67.  
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Gorman, supra note 42.  
 106.  Id.  
 107.  See Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 128.  Modernly, there is some flexibility as to the time 
limits as arbitrators are loath to make a judgment unless the parties have had a full chance to present 
their arguments.  Abrams, supra note 5, at 66 (“[Time limits] have been stretched in practice so that 
each party has a greater opportunity to rebut and clarify.”).  Some arbitrators have pushed 
participants to supply data long before a hearing so it can be “digested.”  Id.  Others have asked for 
more time after hearings to review submissions.  Id.  Neither alternative seems likely to be adopted.  
Id.    
 108.  See generally Thomas V. Hildner & Lisa J. Trembly, Arbitration: Take Charge by 
Understanding and Designing the Process, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, THE MAGAZINE, Oct. 2011 
(discussing privacy and confidentiality in arbitration agreements).   
 109.  Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 110.   
 110.  See Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 128 (describing how opinions are issued): 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the arbitrators are given no more than 24 hours to pick 
either the player’s or the club’s offer.  The panel is prohibited from disclosing either any 
detailed opinion on the case or an explanation of how the panel members voted.  The 
arbitrators simply provide the parties with a one-year uniform player’s contract that has 
the winning salary figure included.   
See also Part V.B.2 (discussing problems with the arbitration process).     
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as to how or why the arbitrators arrived at their decision—neither side is any 
better off the next time around, which only adds to the inherent risk and 
uncertainty of the process. 
C.  Evolution 
While technically the same, the arbitration process is much different 
from what Dick Woodson experienced in 1974.111  For one, players still 
attend, but they no longer speak on their own behalf.112  Perhaps because 
even the lowest-paid players are making significantly more than “fifteen 
grand”113—ironically, by following the trail that Dick Woodson blazed—
they can all afford representation.114  Appearing at one’s arbitration hearing 
without counsel is unprecedented in the modern era. 
Maybe the most significant difference, however, is the treatment of 
players who choose salary arbitration.  Today, arbitration is not just 
tolerated; it is expected.115  Owners still are not too keen on the whole 
system, but players are certainly no longer blackballed for participating.116  
Salary arbitration is as much a part of baseball today as spring training.117  In 
many ways, the evolution of salary arbitration from an amateurish, personal 
exchange to a pragmatic standardized business formality mirrors the 
evolution of baseball itself—from a seasonal, low-paying pastime to a full 
time “job” in a multi-billion dollar business. 
V.  BASEBALL’S RUIN? 
“I have a hard time relating to those figures.” 
-Dick Woodson118 
 
Dick Woodson is certainly not alone in expressing his distaste for the 
 
 111.  See supra Part III. 
 112.  Abrams, supra note 5, at 71 (“The ballplayer always attends his salary arbitration hearing, 
sitting quietly next to his agent.  A decade ago, it was not unusual for a player to say a few words at 
his hearing, but that no longer appears to be the case.”); cf. text accompanying note 74.   
 113.  See supra text accompanying note 69.   
 114.  Contra id. 
 115.  See 2013 Arbitration Eligibles Rumors, MLB TRADE RUMORS, 
http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2013-arbitration-eligibles/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) (speculating 
on the fates of arbitration-eligible players in MLB).   
 116.  Contra note 80 and accompanying text.   
 117.  See supra note 115.    
 118.  Audio Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 9. 
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business of baseball as it exists today.119  When Charlie Finley and Dick 
Meyer voted against arbitration, it is unlikely that even they imagined an era 
in professional baseball where one player’s salary could exceed another 
team’s entire payroll.120  Reflecting recently on his experience with 
arbitration and offering his opinion on how it has evolved, Dick Woodson 
said, “I guess overall [the arbitration process] is just like unions in general: 
when they first start out it’s a very good reason why . . . and then I think it 
gets to a point where I’m not sure if it’s not detrimental to the game 
itself.”121  Woodson’s ambivalence speaks to a hot button topic in baseball 
today: the split between those who think arbitration is good for baseball and 
those who think it is bad for baseball. 
A.  The Case Against Arbitration 
Salary arbitration has a serious image problem in the modern era in 
large part because some of the things that make salary arbitration “bad” are 
easy to see; outrageous salaries, work stoppages and holdouts, and 
acrimonious negotiations all play out in the public eye.  Some of the most 
insidious effects of salary arbitration, however, are less conspicuous.  In 
addition to the bloated salaries which get higher every year, there is also the 
way in which salary arbitration decisions are issued,122 the psychological 
impact on players from the adversarial nature of the process,123 and the 
things that owners have begun to do to avoid or delay the process.124 
1.  Outrageous Salaries 
Big league salaries are perhaps the largest obstacle to widespread 
acceptance of salary arbitration.125  Neither league officials nor the general 
public are likely to get behind a practice that supports MLB’s outrageous 
salary figures anytime soon.  Unfortunately, players are equally unlikely to 
 
 119.  See, e.g., Craig Calcaterra, Tim Lincecum’s Case Shows Why Arbitration Sucks, HARDBALL 
TALK (Jan. 20, 2010, 5:25 PM), http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/01/20/tim-lincecums-case-
shows-why-arbitration-sucks/. 
 120.  See The Associated Press, Report: A-Rod the Big Fish, Earns More Than All of Marlins 
Team, ESPN MLB (April 1, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3324199 
(discussing how, in 2008, New York Yankee Alex Rodriguez’s $28 million annual salary exceeded 
the combined total of the entire Florida Marlin’s 33-man roster).  
 121.  Audio Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 9. 
 122.  See supra note 110.  
 123.  See Heitner, supra note 41 (describing the “psychological cost[s]” incurred by players 
hearing about why they are not worth what they think they are worth); see also infra Part V.A.II.    
 124.  See infra Part V.A.III.   
 125.  See Stu on Sports, Major League Baseball Salaries Are out of Control, THE MONTREAL 
GAZETTE (Dec. 7, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://blogs.montrealgazette.com/2012/12/07/major-league-
baseball-salaries-continue-to-skyrocket/. 
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accept any modifications to the current CBA—which expires in 2012—that 
limit their potential earning power.126  Baseball management has criticized 
salary arbitration since its inception for inflating player salaries.127  It is 
apparent, however, that compensation for players eligible for salary 
arbitration has remained almost stable over the past six years while free 
agent salaries have ballooned in the competitive free market.128  It might be 
argued then that salary arbitration has actually controlled inflation in a way 
the owners are unable to do themselves.129 
2.  Making the Case in Arbitration and Issuing Decisions 
The way in which opinions are transmitted and the psychological effects 
on players are both issues with the modern salary arbitration process.130  
Neither seems particularly likely to change anytime soon.  A lack of written 
opinions is more of a problem for the participants themselves (as opposed to 
a problem in the eyes of the public), as both sides would like to get an edge 
any way they can.131  To add a measure of transparency to the process, 
however, would take away from the inherent risk and uncertainty that is so 
important in driving parties to settlement.132  The psychological toll that the 
process takes on players seems equally fixed, but is a much realer concern as 
evidenced by the documented toll on players engaging in salary 
arbitration.133  As the process becomes more standardized and business-like, 
however, it is less likely that players will take issue with owner’s differing 
viewpoints on their stats.  If it really is “just business” then that familiar 
consolation should relieve at least some of the sting. 
 
 126.  It has been argued that the simple imposition of a salary cap could control wages.  See 
Chapters 3–6 in BASEBALL PROSPECTUS, BASEBALL BETWEEN THE NUMBERS: WHY EVERYTHING 
YOU KNOW ABOUT THE GAME IS WRONG (2006) (making the argument for a salary cap in MLB).  
Because a salary cap would limit earning power, however, it is unlikely that—barring some 
significant development—players would agree to take this step.   
 127.  See Abrams, supra note 5, at 72. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130. For example, issues with going through the process as opposed to issues with the results of it.   
 131.  See supra Part IV.B (explaining how, without issuing written decisions, neither side is 
necessarily more knowledge or prepared the next time around—because they do not know what 
factors influenced the arbitrators decisions).   
 132.  See supra note 41.   
 133.  See, e.g., Das, supra note 20, at 58.  In a National Hockey League salary arbitration between 
the New York Islanders and their goalie, the owner introduced humiliating evidence into the 
arbitration hearing about that goalie.  Id.  “The goalie felt so betrayed by his team and the whole 
process, he refused to return to the Islanders the following season.  Thus, the goalie was traded 
because of his refusal to play directly due to the arbitration hearings.”  Id. 
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3.  Owner Tactics 
Perhaps the most troubling side effect of salary arbitration is the 
behavior it induces in league owners who are finding increasingly clever 
ways to avoid or simply delay the process.  Three particularly egregious 
examples from the first decade of the 2000s illustrate the point: (1) the New 
York Yankees’ refusal to offer salary arbitration to star outfielder Bobby 
Abreu after a stellar 2008 season; (2) the Arizona Diamondbacks’ similar 
refusal to offer salary arbitration to Adam Dunn, another star outfielder, that 
same year; and finally, and most egregiously, (3) the Tampa Bay Rays’ 
decision in 2009 to assign star pitcher David Price—their first pick of the 
2007 draft—down to the minor leagues after a season in which he helped 
lead the Rays to The World Series.134 
Abreu and Dunn were not offered salary arbitration because, today, that 
process virtually guarantees an increase in a player’s salary.135  Where there 
is even a shred of doubt as to the continued viability of a player, owners 
would rather cut the player loose and potentially re-sign him in free agency 
at a more reasonable price depending on the state of the market than 
guarantee him a raise by proceeding to salary arbitration.136  As to David 
Price, he was not eligible for free agency, meaning that the decision to 
relegate him to the minors was simply an unabashed attempt by Ray’s 
management to delay his eligibility for salary arbitration.  This kind of 
behavior has led some to criticize owners for charging “full price for tickets 
to see an inferior, manipulated product.”137 
B.  The Case for Arbitration 
It is not necessary to run through the pros of salary arbitration in the 
same way as the cons as it is apparent that both arguments ultimately make 
the case for its continued use in Major League Baseball.  That is because all 
 
 134.  See Ham & Malach, supra note 91, 64–65, 85–86.  According to Ham & Malach, the 
decision to demote Price was not in the best interest of the team in winning games, nor was it in the 
best interest of the paying fans.  Id. at 85.  On the contrary, “[t]he Rays decision to assign [Price] to 
the minor leagues was simply an attempt to delay his arbitration eligibility [as a ‘Super Two’].”  Id.  
A “Super Two” is a player with at least two years of service time, but less than three years, who also 
accumulated at least 86 days of service in the previous year and was in the top 17% of all two-year 
players in service time.   Gorman, supra note 42.  Despite not having three full years of service time, 
“Super Twos” are eligible for salary arbitration pursuant to the 1990  negotiations, which are still in 
effect today.  Id. 
 135.  See Ham & Malach, supra note 91, Gorman, supra note 42 (“The last case where someone 
walked out of an arbitration hearing with less money than they made the previous year was Randy 
Milligan in 1994.  Occasionally players settle prior to their hearing and settle at a salary that is less 
than they made the year before, but even that is extremely rare.”).  
 136.  See generally Ham & Malach, supra note 91.   
 137.  Id. at 87.  
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of the things that make arbitration bad or undesirable only encourage teams 
and players to settle; the worse the process is, the more inclined players and 
clubs will be to come to an agreement in order to avoid going through it.138  
The only real kink in the system is the incentive to arbitrate for more 
money.139 
Statistically, MLB’s arbitration system has accomplished its primary 
goals of fairer player compensation and cooperation between players and 
clubs in the form of mutually agreeable settlements.140  Since arbitration was 
incorporated into the 1973 Basic Agreement,141 84.32% of salary arbitration 
cases filed settled prior to actually being arbitrated.142  Proponents of the 
system highlight the fact that arbitration works quickly and fairly while 
encouraging parties to adopt “realistic, good faith bargaining positions.”143 
As to the inflated salaries, some commentators have argued it is a 
 
 138.  See supra text accompanying notes 41 and 93 (explaining that mutually inherent risk 
encourages settlement).   
 139.  Some commentators argue that players are not arbitrarily arguing for “more money,” but 
rather for fair money.  See Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 132 (quoting Scott Rosner & Kenneth 
Shropshire, THE BUSINESS OF SPORT 269–72, 271, 233 (2004)): 
In the period before collective bargaining and [salary arbitration], player salaries were 
widely described as being “artificially low” as a result of “owners having the luxury of 
being the only employer able to negotiate with [the] player.”  Under the [salary 
arbitration] system, players and owners can now negotiate on equal footing, which 
presumably leads to wage figures that are, at the least, closer to fair market value.  
 140.  See Ben Einbinder, What FINRA Can Learn From Major League Baseball, 12 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 333, 342–44 (2012).  Incidentally, one of the important factors driving players to settle 
prior to arbitration is the knowledge that, in salary arbitration, they will lose the right to negotiate for 
“ancillary benefits.”  See Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 124: 
If a player wants to negotiate a multi-season agreement with benefits beyond simple 
salary, he will be unable to do so if he opts for [salary arbitration].  Therefore, a player 
cannot use this process to negotiate such ancillary rights as a no-trade clause, bonuses 
based on performance, or additional tickets for family members or special travel 
accommodation if he chooses to use this process. 
In this way baseball arbitration is similar to other forms of alternative dispute resolution as they 
relate to trial; one of the most attractive aspects of mediation, for example, is the ability of the 
parties to have control over what the settlement actually looks like.  The fear of losing that control 
encourages the parties to settle out of court and avoid trial in the same way that fear of losing 
ancillary benefits encourages players to come to terms with management before actually going to 
arbitration.     
 141.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text.   
 142.  Einbinder, supra note 140, at 342.  In fact, only twice has the number of arbitrations heard 
exceeded 50% of the cases filed.  Id.  In 2009, more than 97% of the arbitration-eligible players 
settled prior to a hearing.  Id.  More recently, in 2013, MLB “pitched a shutout”—settling all 133 
arbitration eligible cases without a single hearing.  See Associated Press, Arbitration Ends with No 
Hearings, ESPN MLB (Feb. 18, 2013, 2:26 PM).  2013 was the first year since arbitration began in 
1974 that no player who filed went to a hearing.  Id.    
 143.  Einbinder, supra note 140,  at 344 (quoting Donegan, supra note 1, at 204). 
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combination of free agency and salary arbitration that is really to blame.144  
Supporters also attribute the increase in salaries resulting from arbitration to 
the fact that players are underpaid during their first three seasons in the 
major leagues.145  Good faith salary arbitration can give owners an 
opportunity to retain the exclusive services of young experienced players, 
while giving the players an opportunity to increase their salaries at a stage in 
their careers when an otherwise monopolistic system would have prevented 
significant pay raises.146  Salary arbitration in Major League Baseball is 
certainly not perfect, but it is the best and most-developed system of the four 
major professional sports associations, and it appears to be here to stay.147 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Dick Woodson was handpicked for the first MLB salary arbitration in 
1974 because he was the poster child for the pervasive and one-sided abuse 
owners inflicted on players, particularly in the realm of contract 
negotiations.148  Woodson blew his chance to take Calvin Griffith to the 
cleaners,149 but his experience paved the way for nearly every player after 
him to take it to their Calvin Griffith.150  Almost immediately, through 
Woodson’s missteps, players realized how to play the salary arbitration 
game—lucky for them, it was a game they almost could not lose.151  After so 
many years of dictatorial and dismissive treatment, players found themselves 
holding all the cards. 
Through the years the arbitration process has remained largely 
unchanged, yet salaries have continued to increase—and so have owners’ 
profits.  Ultimately, arbitration is not as evil as some owners might have the 
public believe.  It is simply a way of more evenly distributing the revenue 
that the players generate.  As Woodson himself said, “you are not worth a 
tinkers damn unless someone is willing to pay it.”152  The owners were 
always able to pay . . . just not necessary willing.  It was not until Dick 
Woodson—a .500 pitcher on a .500 team153—participated in the first ever 
salary arbitration that the players acquired the power to make them.  So 
 
 144.  Einbinder, supra note 140, at 345 (“Some commentators suggest that if either free agency or 
arbitration had been implemented independently of the other, player salaries would not have 
increased as dramatically.”). 
 145.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text.    
 146.  Chetwynd, supra note 21, at 126.  
 147.  Donegan, supra note 1, at 198.  
 148.  See supra text accompanying note 9.   
 149.  See supra text accompanying note 73.   
 150.  See supra note 73.   
 151.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.   
 152.  Interview with Dick Woodson, supra note 60.  
 153.  See supra text accompanying note 75.   
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while Woodson never directly reaped the benefits of a process he helped 
usher into habitualness, by inadvertently ensuring that there would never be 
“another Dick Woodson,” he nonetheless got his revenge. 
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